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NEW LIMITS ON POLICE VEHICLE SEARCHES IN
WASHINGTON-State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686,
674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
INTRODUCTION
In State v. Ringer, ' the Washington Supreme Court announced two
new constitutional rules for police searches and seizures. First, police ar-
resting a suspect in a car may search the suspect-and the area within the
suspect's immediate control for weapons or evidence, but may not search
the area beyond the arrestee's reach. 2 Second, unless there are exigent
circumstances that justify their dispensing with a warrant, police with
probable cause to search a lawfully stopped vehicle must obtain a warrant
before conducting a search. 3
Various public officials and organizations have criticized Ringer, casti-
gating the Washington Supreme Court for being soft on crime and for
ignoring the clear pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court.4
While careful analysis of Ringer refutes the first of these criticisms, there
is no question that the Washington court broke with recent federal case
law in its analysis and holding. Justice Dolliver, writing for the seven-
member majority, admitted this frankly and announced that federal case
law was irrelevant because the court based its analysis solely on the state
constitution.
5
This Note analyzes the basis for and propriety of the Washington
court's deviation from United States Supreme Court case law and the
court's interpretation of the state constitution. Further, it discusses
Ringer's significance in light of other Washington search and seizure
cases that rely on the state constitution. Finally, this Note discusses the
implications of nonuniformity between federal and Washington search
and seizure law in cases in which the federal and state law enforcement
systems cooperate.
I. THE FACTS OF RINGER
The Ringer court had to rule on the propriety of two warrantless
searches, each of which presented a distinct legal issue. On November 6,
1979, state troopers found Russell J. Ringer, who was wanted on state
1. 10OWn. 2d686, 674P.2d 1240 (1983).
2. Id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1248.
3. Id. at 701,674 P.2d at 1248.
4. For example, Mike Redman of the Washington State Association of Prosecuting Attorneys
stated: "In an incredible number of cases, over a wide variety of issues, the court. . . has made this
state a haven for criminals of all stripes." Seattle Times, July 31, 1984, at D-6, col. 1.
5. 100 Wn. 2d at 689-90,674 P.2d at 1242-43.
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drug charges, seated in his parked van in a highway rest area. 6 While
arresting and handcuffing Ringer, they noticed the odor of marijuana em-
anating from his van. After placing Ringer in their patrol car, they
searched the van and found luggage that appeared to contain drugs. Open-
ing the luggage, the officers found and seized several controlled sub-
stances.7 Ringer was charged with drug possession, and was convicted
after an unsuccessful attempt to suppress the evidence from the warrant-
less search. 8
On August 7, 1981, Bellevue police officers lawfully arrested Eugene
Corcoran on suspicion of boat theft. 9 The officers removed Corcoran
from his car, placed him in a patrol car, and then thoroughly searched his
car. The officers found marijuana in a paper bag on the front seat. ' 0 Like
Ringer, Corcoran was charged with and convicted of drug possession
after he failed in his attempt to suppress the evidence from the warrantless
search. 1
II. THE RINGER COURT'S REASONING
State v. Ringer and Bellevue v. Corcoran, 12 which were consolidated
on appeal, raised two related questions regarding the proper scope of war-
rantless police searches conducted incident to arrest. First, when officers
have arrested a suspect lawfully, what is the scope of the search they may
conduct incident to that arrest? Second, if the officers have independent
probable cause to search the arrestee's vehicle, must they obtain a warrant
before doing so?
Writing for the majority, Justice Dolliver acknowledged that the
searches of both Ringer's and Corcoran's vehicles were constitutional
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 13 Never-
6. Id. at 688, 674 P.2d at 1241-42.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 689. 674 P.2d at 1242.
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 686,674 P.2d at 1240.
13. Id. at 689, 674 P.2d at 1242. In New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454(1981). the United States
Supreme Court upheld a police search of the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle con-
ducted after the officers removed the arrestee from the vehicle. The Court announced a bright-line test
for automobile searches incident to arrest: when police have arrested the occupant of an automobile.
they may, as an incident of that arrest, search the automobile's passenger compartment and any con-
tainers found within it. Id. at 460. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the majority
formulated a bright-line test for the constitutionality of warrantless automobile searches based on
probable cause rather than a contemporaneous arrest. The Ross Court held that when police officers
lawfully stop a vehicle and have probable cause to believe that it contains concealed contraband, they
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theless, the Washington Supreme Court reversed both convictions and an-
nounced its own, more restrictive rules for police automobile searches.
The court limited warrantless searches incident to lawful arrests to the
arrestee's person and the area within his or her immediate control at the
time of the search. 14 Police with probable cause to suspect the presence of
contraband in a lawfully stopped automobile must obtain a search warrant
unless they can show that it could not be done without risking the driver's
escape or the destruction of evidence. 15
A. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
The Washington court arrived at its decision by relying on state search
and seizure law rather than the fourth amendment. 16 The court began by
discussing the adoption of article 1, section 7 of the state constitution and
the contemporaneous common law search incident to arrest doctrine. 17
Article 1, section 7 of Washington's constitution provides: "No person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without au-
thority of law." 18 There is little constitutional history to guide interpreta-
tion of this provision. 19 However, as the Ringer court noted, its framers
adopted it in preference to a proposed section identical to the fourth
amendment. 20 It follows that the level of protection against governmental
invasion of privacy provided by the fourth amendment did not satisfy the
framers of Washington's constitution. 21 Furthermore, the Ringer court
observed that article 1, section 7 of the state constitution suggests that the
court should use the common law in force at the time of the constitution's
enactment to aid it in construing specific constitutional provisions. 22
may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as that which a magistrate could autho-
rize. Id. at 823.
14. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 699, 674 P.2d at 1248.
15. Id. at 699-701, 674P.2dat 1240-43.
16. Id. at 690, 674 P.2d at 1242-43.
17. Id. at 690-93, 674 P.2d at 1242-44.
18. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
19. See Journal of Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889, at vi-vii (B. Rosenow
1962).
20. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 690, 674 P.2d at 1243.
21. This is exactly what the Washington court inferred in State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 622
P.2d 1199 (1980) (court held that article 1, § 7, unlike the fourth amendment, grants criminal defen-
dants automatic standing to challenge police searches and seizures) and State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d
92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982) (article 1, § 7, unlike the fourth amendment, requires that evidence ob-
tained through enforcement of a flagrantly unconstitutional statute be suppressed regardless of the
enforcing officer's good faith belief in the statute's validity).
22. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 690, 674 P.2d at 1243 ("[Construing Const. art. 1, § 7, we look
initially to its origins and to the law of search and seizure at the time our constitution was adopted. ").
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On the basis of its analysis of Washington and British common law, the
Ringer court found that the framers of article 1, section 7 intended to
allow only a very narrow search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement. 23 Only the need to preserve destructible evidence or to pre-
vent the arrestee's escape should justify a warrantless search incident to
arrest. 24 The Ringer court found, however, that in almost every case be-
tween 1922 and 1964, Washington courts upheld searches that went far
beyond the original scope of the search incident to arrest exception.
25
The trend expanding the scope of searches incident to arrest changed in
1964. Washington, following the lead of the United States Supreme
Court, 26 began expanding the constitutional rights of criminal defendants
in search and seizure cases. The Washington Supreme Court disregarded
the plethora of cases interpreting article 1, section 7 of the Washington
constitution, 27 and decided search incident to arrest cases exclusively
under the fourth amendment. 28 The Ringer court noted that during this
The court found two relevant themes in eighteenth and nineteenth century legal treatises and cases.
First, the warrant requirement occupied a central position in Anglo-American law, and courts were
extremely loath to allow warrantless searches or seizures. 100 Wn. 2d at 691. 674 P.2d at 1243.
Second, the court found that the common law allowed officers to make warrantless arrests for misde-
meanors or felonies committed in their presence or when they had probable cause to believe that the
suspect had committed a felony. Id. at 691-92, 674 P.2d at 1243-44. In such situations officers
clearly had no time to obtain a warrant. Courts also permitted police to search the person of an
arrestee for evidence of the crime and for weapons: otherwise, the courts reasoned, an arrestee might
foil the arrest by destroying evidence concealed on his or her person or by using a weapon to escape.
Id.
Washington officially recognized this common law doctrine in State ex rel. Murphy v. Brown, 83
Wash. 100. 145 P. 69 (1914). In dicta, the Murphy court stated that an arresting officer had the right
to take from the arrestee's possession evidence connected with the supposed crime. Id. at 105-06.
145 P. at 71.
23. Ringer. 100 Wn. 2d at 692-93, 674 P.2d at 1243-44. (citing State v. Michaels, 60 Wn. 2d
638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962); Dillon v. O'Brien, 20 L.R. Ir. 300. 316-17 (Ex. D. 1887): Leigh v. Cole.
6 Cox Crim. L. Cas. 329, (Oxford Cir. 1853)).
24. 100 Wn. 2d at 692-93, 674 P.2d at 1243-44.
25. Id. at 695, 674 P.2d at 1245. See, e.g.. State v. Jackovick. 56 Wn. 2d 915. 355 P.2d 976
(1960): State v. Cyr, 40 Wn. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952): State v. Miller. 151 Wash. 114. 275 P. 75
(1929); State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 239 P. 386 (1925): State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 P.
841 (1923). The most glaring example of this is State v. McCollum. 17 Wn. 2d 85, 136 P.2d 165
(1943). The police arrested McCollum in a hospital several miles distant from his home. yet the
McCollum majority upheld a search of his home as an incident to the arrest. Id. at 89-90. 136 P.2d at
167.
26. E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (holding that searches made after the
arrest and in another place are not incident to arrest): Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding
that the exclusionary rule applies to the states).
27. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 697, 674 P.2d at 1246.
28. The fourth amendment standard regarding searches incident to arrest was exemplified by
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364. 367 (1964), in which the Court held: '[o]nce an accused is
under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not
incident to the arrest.""
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period the United States Supreme Court interpreted the search incident to
arrest exception consistent with its common law origins.
29
In the 1981 case of New York v. Belton,30 however, the United States
Supreme Court broke with this pattern. In Ringer, the Washington Su-
preme Court rejected Belton and returned to article 1, section 7 of the
state constitution as the basis for Washington search and seizure law.
31
The Ringer court found that neither the search of Ringer's van nor that
of Corcoran's automobile passed muster under its newly formulated
search incident to arrest rule. In each case officers handcuffed the defen-
dant and placed him in a patrol car before searching his vehicle. Neither
defendant had the slightest opportunity to frustrate the arrest by reaching
into his vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence.
32
B. The Exigent Circumstances Exception
The court next dealt with a separate question raised by the search of
Ringer's van: did the fact that the arresting officer had probable cause to
believe that the van contained drugs justify his warrantless search? 33 In
United States v. Ross, 34 the United States Supreme Court held that police
officers who legitimately stop an automobile, and who have probable
29. 100 Wn. 2d at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247. E.g., State v. Riggins, 64 Wn. 2d 881, 395 P.2d 85
(1964). This trend continued until the late 1970's when the court again began relying on article 1, § 7.
30. 453 U.S. 454(1981).
31. The Ringer court stated:
We choose now to return to the protections of our own constitution and to interpret them
consistent with their common law beginnings. . . . we conclude that, when a lawful arrest is
made, the arresting officer may search the person arresied and the area within his immediate
control.... A warrantless search in this situation is permissible only to remove any weapons the
arrestee might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect an escape and to avoid destruction of
evidence by the arrestee of the crime for which he or she is arrested.
100 Wn. 2d at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247-48.
In its analysis, the Ringer court did not explicitly criticize Belton. This restraint is puzzling; as the
court's ruling represents a dramatic break from federal case law, which it had followed in the search
incident to arrest area for fifteen years, one would have expected a thorough discussion of Belton and
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), and an explanation of why the present court found the
rationales of those decisions untenable. However, the Ringer court may not have disagreed with
Belton and Ross insofar as they established minimum constitutional standards. A rule that binds all
fifty states should perhaps be less stringent than one binding only one state. Individual states that find
a federal standard too lax can always promulgate stricter standards, while a state faced with a strict
federal rule has little flexibility in applying it. It is also possible that the Ringer court avoided discuss-
ing Belton and Ross at length because it wanted to make it absolutely clear that those cases were
irrelevant to its decision. An extended discussion of federal cases might have obscured the impor-
tance of the court's state constitutional analysis.
32. 100 Wn. 2d at 700, 674 P.2d at 1248.
33. This question did not arise with respect to Corcoran, as the officers in his case did not have
probable cause to search his car.
34. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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cause to believe that it conceals contraband, may conduct a warrantless
search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize.
The Ross Court relied on a long line of federal decisions holding that
vehicle searches should be judged by less stringent standards than build-
ing searches. 35
The Ringer court acknowledged that the search was acceptable under
federal constitutional standards, 36 but chose to follow an early Washing-
ton case holding that article 1, section 7 protects automobiles as fully as it
protects houses.37
The Ringer court found, however, that Washington law did recognize
an "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement. 38
State officers could dispense with a warrant when confronted by emergen-
cies and exigencies. Exigency, the court continued, depends on the to-
tality of the circumstances in each case, including the possible availability
of a telephonic warrant. 39 Those seeking the exemption must show that
the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. 40 As the offi-
cers had not shown that any exigencies compelled them to search
Ringer's van without a warrant, and apparently had not tried to obtain a
telephonic warrant, the court held the exigent circumstances exception
inapplicable.
41
35. This so-called "'automobile exception- began with Carroll v. United States. 267 U.S. 132
(1925). where the Court upheld the conviction of bootleggers obtained by means of evidence seized
in a warrantless search of their automobile. The Court stated that because an automobile is inherently
mobile, the fourth amendment does not require police officers to obtain a warrant every time theN
have probable cause to search: otherwise the automobile's owners would simply drive out of the
jurisdiction before police officers obtained the warrant. Id. at 153. The United States Supreme Court
still follows Carroll. E.g., Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
36. Ringer, 100 Wn 2d at 689. 674 P.2d at 1242.
37. Id. at 700, 674 P.2d at 1248 (citing State v. Gibbons. 118 Wash. 171. 203 P. 390 (1922)).
38. 100Wn. 2d at 701-02. 674 P.2d at 1248-49.
39. Id. The court reasoned that the availability of a telephonic warrant reduces the need for offi-
cers to make a warrantless search. Id. (citing Marek. Telephonic Search Warrants: A New Equation
for Exigent Circumstances, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv 35 (1978)).
40. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 701. 674 P.2d at 1249. Presumably. the "exigent circumstances"
exception applies whenever a police officer does not reasonably have time to present evidence of
probable cause to a judicial officer.
41. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 703. 674 P.2d at 1249.
Justice Dimmick, joined by Justice Dore, dissented from the court's opinion. Id. at 703-06. 674
P.2d at 1250-51. Justice Dimmick had little quarrel with the majority's analysis of search incident to
arrest doctrine, focusing her criticism instead on the majority's dismissal of the "automobile excep-
tion" to the warrant requirement. Id. at 704. 674 P.2d at 1250. She argued that several recent Wash-
ington cases had recognized the exception, although she admitted that they had often confused it with
the search incident to arrest exception.
Justice Dimmick read these cases as requiring only that vehicle searches be reasonable under the
circumstances, and in her opinion, when circumstances include a lawful arrest and probable cause to
believe the vehicle carries contraband, a warrantless search is nearly always reasonable. Id. at
704-05, 674 P.2d at 1250-51. Because the officers in Ringer's case had probable cause to search his
van. Justice Dimmick found it eminently reasonable for them to dispense with a warrant.
Vol. 60:177, 1984
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III. THE INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION OF
WASHINGTON'S CONSTITUTION
A. Use of State Constitutions to Expand Individual Rights as a National
Trend
Washington is not the first state to interpret its own constitution as im-
posing different restraints on police than the federal constitution. In the
early 1970's, a new trend in state constitutional law appeared. Increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the Burger Court's conservative approach to indi-
vidual rights,42 state courts have begun using the federal constitution as
merely a starting point in their constitutionalanalyses. If a particular gov-
ernment action passes muster under the federal constitution, the courts
will scrutinize it closely for conformity with state constititional stan-
dards. Their premise is that the federal Bill of Rights establishes mini-
mum rather than maximum civil rights guarantees .43
For example, in People v. Anderson,44 the California Supreme Court
held the death penalty unconstitutional under 'state law. Although the
United States Supreme Court had never held the death penalty per se un-
consitutional under the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishment, 45 the Anderson court held that the death penalty vio-
lated a state constitutional provision. California's constitution differs
from the eighth amendment in that it prohibits cruel or unusual punish-
ment.46 The court reasoned that the state constitution's different wording
justified a different standard than that imposed by the eighth amend-
ment. 47
Not only did she find the majority's new constitutional rule inconsistent with recent precedent, but
she predicted that it would cause great confusion among police officers accustomed to relying on
federal precedent, and pointed out that innumerable convictions based on evidence obtained under the
old law were now in doubt. Id. at 706, 674 P.2d at 1251. Finally, she argued that the new rule would
not increase the constitutional rights of arrested individuals, as warrants are mere formalities follow-
ing upon a police officer's finding of probable cause. Id.
42. See Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Note, The Independent Application of State Constitutional Provisions
to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 596 (1979).
43. See Note, supra note 42.
44. 6 Cal. 3d 628,493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 983 (1972).
45. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court appeared to abolish the death penalty
when it held that, as applied, Georgia's death penalty was unconstitutional. The Court later clarified
its Furman decision, finding that the death penalty could be constitutional if applied systematically
and with allowances for consideration of extenuating circumstances in each case. E.g., Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v, Texas, 428 U.S.
262(1976).
46. CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, § 6.
47. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 634-39,493 P.2d at 883-87; 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155-59.
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In People v. Brisendine,48 the California court went further and con-
strued its state constitutional search and seizure provision as guaranteeing
greater privacy rights than does the fourth amendment, even though the
state and federal provisions are virtually identical. 49 Specifically, the
court refused to follow United States v. Robinson,50 which allowed police
to conduct full-scale body searches of all persons arrested and taken into
custody, even if the arrestee's only offense was a minor traffic violation.
Other states have followed California's lead, particularly in the area of
search and seizure law; Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, New Hampshire,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, among others,
have begun forging new protections for their citizens against warrantless
police searches and seizures.
51
This trend of construing state constitutional provisions to afford greater
individual rights than their federal counterparts is recent. In the Warren
Court years, state courts usually began their constitutional analyses by
determining whether the United States Supreme Court had held that the
relevant Bill of Rights provision applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. If so, the court applied federal
precedent. 52 Where the United States Supreme Court had not incorpo-
rated a specific Bill of Rights provision into the due process clause, the
state courts almost invariably construed state constitutional provisions as
providing fewer individual rights than their federal counterparts.
53
B. Supreme Court Review of State Constitutional Decisions
State courts may safely turn to their state constitutions in order to avoid
unpalatable federal precedent. The Supreme Court will not review state
court decisions relying on "adequate and independent" state grounds.
54
48. 18 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
49. 18 Cal. 3d at 552-53, 531 P.2d at 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 330-31. The people of California
recently nullified Brisendine's effect by amending their constitution to provide that -'[e]xcept as pro-
vided by statute ... relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding .... " CAL
CONST art. 1, § 28(d) (1879, amended 1982). Now, only the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution limits the right of the California legislature to pass search and seizure laws.
50. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
51. See Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969): State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 52 (Hawaii
1974); State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1977); State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226. 471 A.2d 347
(1983); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 789, 228 N.E.2d 783 (1964); State v. Car-
aher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983): State v.
Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1980).
52. See Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 271, 274 (1975).
53. See Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA L. REV 165. 174
(1984).
54. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3474 (1983).
Vol. 60:177, 1984
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An adequate state ground is one that defeats no important federal inter-
ests. 55 Presumably, therefore, if granting an individual right under the
state constitution impairs another person's federal constitutional rights,
the state court's decision is not immune from Supreme Court review.,
The term "independent" was traditionally shorthand for any non-
federal ground-statutory, constitutional, or one based- on the court's
general supervisory powers. 56 In its recent decision in Michigan v.
Long,57 however, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of its review of
state decisions. It indicated that unless it is apparent -that a state'court
bases its decision on independent state grounds, the Supreme Court will
accept review. 58 In light of the Long presumption, it'appears that state
courts cannot insulate their decisions from Supreme Court review unless
they can justify their holdings by substantial reference to state constitu-
tions or cases.
The Ringer court made every effort to avoid the possibility of Supreme
Court review. First, the opinion frankly admitted that its holding con-
flicted with, federal precedent and that it relied on federal 'cases only for
guidance. 59 The court thus avoided any confusion as to whether it based
its decision on federal or state grounds. Second, it did not discuss the
merits of the federal search and seizure cases, 60 implying that those cases
were irrelevant to its decision. Third, and most important, the Ringer ma-
jority focused its analysis on article 1, section 7 of the state constitution,
delving into its legislative history, examining its common lawcontext;
and criticizing judicial interpretations of the section. In So doing,, the
Ringer court met the Long test, foreclosed Supreme Court review, and
established a new search and seizure rule for Washington.
C. The Basis and Propriety of the Ringer Court's Reliance on the State
Constitution
The question remains, whether the Washington Supreme Court's ap-
proach in Ringer was justified. That question can be divided into three
parts. First, was there a proper basis in state law for developing a search
incident to arrest standard different from the United States Supreme
Court's fourth amendment standard?61 Second, was the Ringer decision
55.. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
56. See Note, supra note 42, at 601.
57. 103S. Ct. 3469.
58. Id. at 3474.
59. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 689-90, 674 P.2d at 1242-43.
60. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
61. For an excellent article discussing the independent interpretation of Washington's constitu-
Washington Law Review Vol. 60:177, 1984
substantively proper? Finally, will the decision be overly burdensome to
law enforcement agencies?
1. There Exists a State Law Basis for the Ringer Analysis
The first question, whether state law provides a solid basis for the
Ringer court's decision, 62 requires a two-part analysis: (a) do the text and
history of article 1, section 7 support the conclusion that it is more protec-
tive of an accused's rights than the fourth amendment, and (b) is there
judicial precedent for interpreting article 1, section 7 differently from its
federal counterpart?
tion, see Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and
the Washington Declaration ofRights, 7 U.P.S. L. REv' 491 (1984).
62. Recently Justice Horowitz, then associate justice of the Washington Supreme Court. dis-
sented strongly from an opinion establishing an independent interpretation of article 1, § 7. State v.
Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 195-203, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). Stating that "liln the past, this court has
always interpreted the federal and state search and seizure requirements identically." Justice
Horowitz suggested that the state constitution should be given an interpretation different from that
afforded the federal constitution only after careful examination of four criteria. Id. at 196. 199-202.
622 P.2d 1216-18; see also Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the
State Constitution, 29 STAN L. REV- 297, 300 (1977). First, the court should compare the language
of similar state and federal provisions to see whether any differences mandate an independent state
constitutional interpretation. Second, the court should explore state precedents to see if they provide
justifications for an independent state interpretation. Third, the court should determine whether
unique local conditions exist that might warrant an independent interpretation. Finally. the court
should consider the United States Supreme Court's position on the issue. Simpson. 95 Wn. 2d at
200-02, 622 P.2d at 1216.
No court has adopted Justice Horowitz's test. While it is a praiseworthy attempt to ensure that
uniformity between state and federal law is not abandoned without good reason, it has several serious
flaws. First, the requirement that state constitutional language mandate an independent interpretation
is at once too vague and too stringent. It is absurd to suppose that the framers of 1889 had the pre-
science to draft constitutional language that would require in 1984 an interpretation differing from
that of another, equally expansive, constitutional provision. The fourth criterion is even less compel-
ling. Disagreeing with Supreme Court case law is analytically a prerequisite to considering whether
one must follow it. Therefore, an examination of Supreme Court interpretations of a federal constitu-
tional provision would not be of the slightest use in deciding whether a state constitutional provision
can be interpreted differently.
More important is that the above criteria ignore the fact that dual sovereignty is a fundamental and
prized element of the American system, developed precisely for the purpose of providing citizens
with two sources of regulation and protection. See Utter, supra note 61. at 494 (citing Alderwood
Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wn. 2d 230, 237-38. 635 P.2d 108, 113 (1981). Thus,
independent state court interpretation should be encouraged. See Oregon v. Hass. 420 U.S. 714
(1975). If state constitutions provide exactly the same protections as their federal counterparts, they
become redundant, a result at odds with the intentions of their creators.
Given that premise, it is irrelevant whether state courts can find linguistic variations between fed-
eral and state provisions that mandate different interpretations of each. It is also irrelevant that state
courts have previously seen no necessity to interpret their state constitutions independently. They
cannot lose the power to interpret their own constitution in any way they see fit, within federal consti-
tutional limits, merely because they have adhered to a federal stand for many years.
Washington's New Car Search Rule
In determining whether the state constitution's framers intended to af-
ford individuals greater protection from police searches and seizures, one
must begin by comparing the language of article 1, section 7 with that of
the fourth amendment..63 The differences between the two are remark-
able. Not only is article 1, section 7 much simpler than its federal coun-
terpart, but its emphasis is quite different. Rather than prohibiting specific
police practices, it declares an uncategorical right to privacy. Moreover,
the framers did not dilute this declaration by referring to "reasonable"
invasions of privacy. On the other hand, the fourth amendment does not
explicity establish an individual right; it merely sets "reasonable" limits
on police searches and seizures. The language of the two provisions justi-
fies an inference that the framers intended article 1, section 7 to afford the
individual greater rights than those provided by federal law. Bolstering
this inference is the fact that the men at the Washington Constitutional
Convention passed upon and rejected a provision identical to the fourth
amendment before adopting the language of article 1, section 7.64
Further, recent Washington case law supports an interpretation of arti-
cle 1, section 7 more protective of individual rights than the fourth
amendment. In State v. Hehman,65 the Washington court refused to fol-
low United States v. Robinson66 and Gustafson v. Florida.67 In these
cases the United States Supreme Court held that police could make custo-
dial arrests for minor traffic violations, and that those custodial arrests
trigger a right to search the arrestee. 68
In State v. Simpson,69 the Washington court granted criminal defen-
dants automatic standing70 to contest warrantless searches and seizures
63. Article I, § 7 provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONSr. art. I, § 7. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text discussion regarding article 1, § 7.
65. 90 Wn. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978).
66. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
67. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
68. See State v. Hehman, 90 Wn. 2d at 47-50, 578 P.2d at 528-29.
69. State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
70. In general, a criminal defendant may challenge a police search or seizure only if he or she has
a reasonable expection of privacy in the area searched or property seized. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978). In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the Supreme Court created an
exception to this rule for cases in which the criminal charge includes possession of property as an
element. The Court thus granted defendants automatic standing to raise fourth amendment claims
even where they had stolen the property searched or seized, and therefore had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the property. However, in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), the Court
overruled Jones and abolished fourth amendment automatic standing.
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that produced evidence usable at trial. Basing its decision on article 1.
section 7 of the state constitution, the court declined to follow the federal
rule abolishing automatic standing.
71
In State v. White,72 the Washington court refused to follow the United
States Supreme Court in establishing a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule where officers rely on flagrantly unconstitutional, but as
yet unrepealed, vagrancy statutes. 73 The court found in article 1, section
7 an emphasis on protecting personal rights rather than on limiting gov-
ernmental actions, which mandated a different approach than that taken
under the fourth amendment. 74
Ringer thus follows three cases proclaiming the state court's right to
interpret article 1, section 7 as more protective of individual rights than
the fourth amendment. Together, these cases establish a consistent, prin-
cipled basis for applying the state constitution to search and seizure ques-
tions, and put police on notice that Washington courts will not tolerate
overreaching searches and arrests that violate individual rights. 75
71. 95 Wn. 2d at 177, 622 P.2d at 1206. The court commented: "Such independent interpreta-
tion is particularly appropriate when the language of the state provisions differs from the federal, and
the legislative history of the state constitution reveals that this difference was intended by the fram-
ers. " Id. (citations omitted).
72. 97Wn.2d92,640P.2d 1061 (1982).
73. In Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). the Supreme Court held the exclusionary
rule inapplicable to a case where an officer enforced an unconstitutional, but as yet unrepealed, stat-
ute in the good faith belief that it was valid. The White court rejected the good faith standard, finding
it too subjective and unworkable: "How do courts probe the minds of officers to see if their beliefs of
validity are truly held?" 97 Wn. 2d at 107 n.6, 640 P.2d at 1069 n.6.
74. Id. atllO, 640P.2dat 1071.
75. In State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). decided shortly after Ringer.
the Washington Supreme Court continued this trend. The Chrisman court refused to follow the Su-
preme Court's application of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement to a particular set of
facts. The plain view doctrine is based on the common sense notion that police do not need to
"search" for something they can see plainly; it follows that they need not obtain a search warrant
before seizing contraband plainly in view. In Chrisman, campus police had arrested a student for
possessing alcohol. They accompanied him to his dormitory room so that he might retrieve his stu-
dent identification card. While waiting outside the room for him, one of the officers noticed a pipe
and a green substance lying on the student's desk. The officer stepped into the room and looked at the
substance closely. It proved to be marijuana, and the student was arrested and convicted of drug
possession. Id. at 815-16, 676 P.2d at 421. When Chrisman appealed the case to the state supreme
court, the court reversed his conviction on the ground that the officers had violated the fourth amend-
ment by stepping into Chrisman's room without a warrant. Id. at 816. 676 P.2d at 421. The United
States Supreme Court, however, held that the search was proper under the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement, as the officer had the right to enter Chrisman's room. id. at 819, 676 P.2d at
423. It remanded the case to the state court for clarification of its opinion. On remand, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that the search of Chrisman's room violated article I. § 7 of the state consti-
tution, and again reversed his conviction. Id. at 822, 676 P.2d at 424.
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2. The Majority's Decision Was Substantively Proper
The Ringer majority's new rule for Washington is also logical and per-
suasive. Justice Dolliver's thorough research into the common law pro-
vides a strong basis for his criticism of cases upholding broad searches
conducted incident to lawful arrests. Given the central importance of the
warrant requirement in Anglo-American jurisprudence, it is appropriate
to construe established exceptions narrowly. For the same reason, courts
should be wary of creating new exceptions, and should not extend the
scope of those exceptions beyond their justifications. The Ringer court
properly acted to limit the scope of searches incident to arrest. Recogniz-
ing that the search incident to arrest exception was intended only to pre-
vent frustration of a lawful arrest, it restricted the permissible scope of
such a search to the area into which an arrestee might reach. Officers
cannot use arrests to justify fishing expeditions for contraband or evi-
dence of crime.
The court's rejection of the automobile exception is consistent with its
search incident to arrest analysis. The automobile exception establishes
an entire class of effects that police may search without a warrant. Courts
attempt to justify the exception by pointing out that automobiles are in-
herently mobile 76 and by arguing that persons have fewer expectations of
privacy in the contents of their vehicles than in the contents of their
houses.77
Neither of these justifications is persuasive. The first appears to be a
necessity argument: as cars are inherently mobile, drivers may move
them out of the jurisdiction before police can obtain a search warrant.
This argument is flawed because, in fact, the vehicle may be immobile:
(1) the vehicle's owner may be under arrest and thus unable to move the
vehicle or to retrieve its contents; (2) the owner may agree to let police
seize his or her vehicle long enough to obtain a warrant rather than submit
to an immediate search; or (3) the vehicle may be abandoned or inoper-
able. That it may be necessary in some cases to search an automobile
without a warrant does not justify dispensing with the warrant require-
ment whenever an automobile is the subject of a search.
The second argument is equally flawed. It is unquestionable that people
do not expect as much privacy in an automobile as in a house; they are
certainly aware that others may watch them as they drive. Nevertheless,
that lack of privacy does not extend to the contents of parcels, especially
76. E.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). This rationale was first articulated by the
Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
77. The idea that the fourth amendment protects only "reasonable expectation[s] of privacy"
originated with Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967), and was adopted by the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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if they have placed those parcels in the glove compartment or under a
seat. In fact, people retain many important expectations of privacy while
in a car. Therefore, one cannot justify a generalized automobile exception
to the warrant requirement on the basis of automobiles' comparative
openness.
Recognizing an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant re-
quirement is a sensible approach to automobile search cases. Its purpose,
to prevent frustration of a probable cause search, is analogous to the
"preventing frustration of an arrest" purpose of the search incident to
arrest exception. If an officer can show that it was impossible to obtain a
warrant without risking the removal of the automobile from the jurisdic-
tion, the search is permissible. The exception draws a rational distinction
between cases in which it is necessary to search at once and those in
which it is not. It thus allows police to operate efficiently without jeopar-
dizing the existence of the warrant requirement.
Ringer does not formulate a bright-line test for the constitutionality of
automobile searches as the United States Supreme Court did in United
States v. Ross 78 and New York v. Belton. 79 In Washington, police cannot
be absolutely certain in a particular case that a search is constitutional, as
they often could be under federal law. They, and later the reviewing
court, must consider the facts and circumstances in each case and judge
for themselves the permissible scope of a warrantless search. This should
not be difficult, however. By explaining the purposes of the search inci-
dent to arrest and exigent circumstances exceptions, Ringer gives each
officer the tools to make an intelligent determination of constitutionality.
If the police realize that only the need to prevent frustration of the arrest
and the destruction of evidence justifies a search incident to arrest, they
will not search an automobile after its owner has been arrested and se-
cured in patrol car. On the other hand, Ringer will not prohibit them from
searching the arrestee and the area within his or her reach.
Similarly, when police lawfully stop a car and have probable cause to
search it, Ringer's rule of exigency will guide them in deciding whether
to search without a warrant. If the officers have arrested all the car's occu-
pants and have taken them to the police station, there is usually no need to
conduct an immediate car search. If, however, there is probable cause to
search the car, but no basis for arresting or detaining its occupants, there
is a real danger that the driver will remove the car from the jurisdiction
before police can obtain a warrant. In that case, the exigent circumstances
exception comes into play and a warrantless search is permissible.
78. 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
79. 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Expecting police to make such judgments is not unreasonable. Police
confront emergencies frequently, and often make split-second decisions.
Once they understand the rule of necessity that Ringer imposes, they
should be able to apply it in almost any circumstance. A bright-line rule
that draws arbitrary distinctions between the passenger compartment and
the trunk of an automobile, on the other hand, breaks down whenever an
officer is confronted by a situation not fitting neatly into existing catego-
ries.80
3. The Practical Effect of Ringer on Local Law Enforcement
One reason for concern regarding the independent interpretation of
state constitutions is the loss of uniformity in law enforcement. Together,
Ringer, Hehman, White, and Simpson create a chasm between federal and
state arrest and search procedures that will undoubtedly cause confusion
in both state and federal law justice systems.
State and federal law enforcement agencies often cooperate. If state
police violate article 1, section 7 and turn the improperly seized evidence
over to a federal prosecutor, will a federal court suppress the evidence?
Likewise, if Federal Bureau of Investigation agents conduct a search
proper under the fourth amendment but improper under article 1, section
7 and the target of the search is later prosecuted by the state, must a state
court suppress the evidence? 81'
Ringer does little to clarify these questions. However, the Washington
court has indicated that it views article 1, section 7 as protecting individu-
als regardless of who searched or arrested them. 82 If that is indeed the
case, then state courts will suppress searches prohibited by Ringer even if
federal agents conducted those searches. This could mean that the federal
courts will be deluged with cases against Washington defendants, be-
cause federal prosecutors will find it easier to win convictions in any case
involving a warrantless search or seizure. That, however, is unlikely; fed-
eral court dockets are too crowded and states' obligations for handling the
bulk of criminal prosecutions are too well established. The more likely
result is that both state and federal police in Washington will restrict the
80. In Belton, for instance, the Court implicitly drew a distinction between the passenger com-
partment and trunk of a car, holding that with probable cause police officers may search the former
but not the latter. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion pointed out that the distinction is artificial and
breaks down when applied to such vehicles as hatchbacks or station wagons. 456 U.S. at 470 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
81. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MIN. L. REv. 349, 367-72
(1974), suggesting that the answer to these questions may depend upon whether the courts view the
relevant provision as a police regulation or as a guarantee of individual rights.
82. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 177-78, 622 P.2d 1203, 1206 (1980).
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scope of their searches to conform with Ringer's requirements. Such a
result will secure the citizens of Washington against police harassment
without sacrificing police effectiveness. Naturally, police will properly
continue to search suspicious vehicles and containers; however, they now
must first obtain a warrant, absent exigent circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
In State v. Ringer, the Washington Supreme Court created a new rule
for police automobile searches that breaks significantly with federal case
law. The court relied on the state constitution to establish a rule more
protective of individual rights than that now mandated by the federal con-
stitution. Its ruling is consistent with the strong federalism envisioned by
the founders of this country and firmly established by the United States
Supreme Court. The ruling means, however, that federal and state police
will operate under different standards-a result that may cause some con-
fusion in cases where the two collaborate. To eliminate confusion, the
Washington Supreme Court should clarify Ringer's application to cases
in which federal and state law enforcement agencies cooperate.
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